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Massive Russian missile strikes are having no influence on Ukraine frontline

Russian forces carried out large-scale missile strike across Ukraine on the 2nd time in a row on October 11. On October 11, the Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces fired close to 30 Kh-101 and Kh-55 cruise missiles from Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers. They also damaged vital infrastructure in Lviv, Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia Oblasts. [1] Ukrainian air defense was reported to have destroyed 21 cruise missiles as well as 11 UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) (UAVs). [2] Social media videos demonstrate the aftermath of attacks across Ukraine. [3] Russian forces additionally continued to launch attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure with Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones. 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defense had destroyed eight Shahed-136 drones in Mykolaiv Oblast on the night of October 10 and 11. [5]

Army General Sergey Surovikin’s previous experiences as the commander of Russian Armed Forces in Syria probably does not account for the massive wave of missile strikes across Ukraine during the past few days, nor does it signal any shift in the direction of Russian capabilities or its strategy in Ukraine. The Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative, Andriy Yusov, linked the recent strike to Surovikin’s appointment as theater commander. He stated on October 11 on the 11th of October that “throwing rockets at civilian infrastructure objects” is in line with Surovikin’s tactics in Syria. [6] However, Surovikin has been serving in Ukraine (as the commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces and then of the southern grouping of Russian forces) since the beginning of the war, and so have many senior Russian commanders similarly associated with Russian actions in Syria. 7th The Army general Aleksandr Dvornikov, who was appointed in April to the position which Surovikin is currently in, commanded Russian troops in Syria between 2015 and 2016 and was known for deliberately and brutally attacking civilians. [8] Colonel General Aleksandr Chayko, the former commander of the Eastern Military District who took an active part in the first stages of the war in Ukraine and also served as Chief of Staff for Russian forces in Syria from 2015 and into the year 2016. 9] As ISW reported in April that all Russian military district or airborne commanders have served at least one mission in Syria as either the chief of staff or commander of Russian forces, and Russian forces specifically attacked civilian infrastructure such as breadlines and hospitals during the time of Russia’s active involvement in that war. 10. Disregard for international law and a zeal to savagely attack civilians was the norm for Russian troops in Syria prior to, during, and after the rule of Surovikin. It has become part of the Russian strategy of war.

Surovikin’s selection will not result in a further “Syrianization” of Russian operations in Ukraine because the battlespace in Ukraine is vastly distinct from the battlefields in Syria, and direct comparisons to Surovikin’s Syrian “playbook” obfuscate the reality that Russia faces very different issues in Ukraine. Russia cannot continue to “Syrianize” the war largely due to its inability to achieve air supremacy that prevents it from being able to conduct the type of massive carpet-bombing campaign throughout Ukraine that it could, and did carry out in Syria. ISW has previously concluded the fact that Russian air operations would be significantly different if conducted in an airspace that was contested or in a demanding air defense environment, such as is the situation in Ukraine. The conclusion is that it is extremely unlikely that the role of Surovikin as theatre commander will cause a fundamental change in Russian air and missile operations in Ukraine in the long run, as the country’s Western supporters continue to supply Kyiv in the form of air defenses required to prevent Russia in gaining aerial superiority.

Russian military officials may instead have coordinated the appointment of Surovikin and the October 10 cruise missile strikes against Ukrainian crucial infrastructure to help improve the image of that of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Whoever was appointed as theater commander was responsible for the October 10 cruise missile strikes that Ukrainian intelligence reports claimed had been in the works from the beginning of October (and Surovikin definitely didn’t plan, prepare for, and take part in on the day of the appointment). [12] Russian milbloggers have recently lauded both the massive storm of strikes that took place on October 10 and Surovikin’s selection and linked the two as positive developments for Russian operations in Ukraine. This may be in line with the ongoing Russian information operations in order to repair the reputation for Central Military District Command Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin following Russian failures around Lyman within a bigger campaign to bolster public opinion regarding and support for the Russian army establishment. The Russian MoD has clearly put a lot of effort in repairing its public image, and the informational results of the 10 October missile attacks as well as the selection of Surovikin as a hero in the extreme nationalist Russian media, is likely intended to appeal to the most vocal voices in this space.

The Russian Federation is likely extracting ammunition and other materiel from Belarusian storage bases, an activity that is incompatible with setting conditions for a large-scale Russian or Belarusian ground assault on Ukraine from Belarus. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 11 that a train loaded with 492 tons of ammunition from the Belarusian 43rd Missile and Ammunition Storage Arsenal in Gomel arrived at the Kirovskaya Railway Station in Crimea on an unspecified recent past date. [13] The GUR reported that Belarusian officials plan to send an additional 13 trains with weapons, equipment, ammunition, and other unspecified materiel from five different Belarusian bases to the Kamenska (Kamensk-Shakhtinsky) and Marchevo (Taganrog) railway stations in Rostov Oblast on an unspecified future date. Open-source social media footage confirms this claim. Geolocated footage shows at least two Belarusian trains carrying Belarusian T-72 tanks and Ural military vehicles in Minsk and Tor-M2 surface-to-air missile launchers inside Orsha (Vitebsk Oblast) on the 11th of October. 14. Belarusian equipment moves to Russia indicate it is likely that Russian as well as Belarusian forces are likely not setting up assembly zones in Belarus. Belarusian equipment and supply movements towards Crimea and Rostov Oblast suggest the fact that Russian forces are less certain about their security Russian ground lines of communication running through northern and western Luhansk Oblast in light of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive there. The Ukraine’s General Staff reiterated that it supervises Belarus and hasn’t observed indicators of the formation of offensive groups in Belarus on October 11. [15The General Staff of Ukraine reiterated that Russian and/or Belarusian forces are not likely to strike Ukraine from Belarus, as ISW previously analyzed. [16]

Belarus remains a co-belligerent in Russia’s conflict against Ukraine, nonetheless. Belarus is a major partner in Russian military operations in Ukraine and supplies Russian forces with havens from which to attack Ukraine with precision weapons. Russian forces struck Kyiv with Shahed-136 drones launched from Belarusian territory on October 10. [17] The GUR further reported that Russia had deployed 32 drones from the Shahed-136 series to Belarus at the time of October 10 and that Russia will be deploying eight more to Belarus by October 14. [18]

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces carried out large-scale missile strike across Ukraine on the 2nd day in a row.
  • General Sergey Surovikin’s previous experience as the commander of Russian Armed Forces in Syria is probably not related to the huge wave of missile strikes across Ukraine in the last few days. Neither does it signal a change in the direction of Russian capabilities or strategies on the ground in Ukraine.
  • HTML0 Russian Federation is likely extracting ammunition and other materiel from Belarusian storage bases that are incompatible with the notion of Russian forces are setting conditions for a ground strike towards Ukraine in Belarus.
  • Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces continued to engage in counteroffensives in the eastern part along the Oskil River and in the direction of Kreminna-Svatove.
  • Russian sources claim that Ukrainian troops were continuing ground operations in northern and western Kherson Oblast.
  • Ukrainian forces are conducting an ongoing interdiction campaign that targets Russian military, technical, and logistics assets and areas of concentration in Kherson Oblast.
  • HTML0Russian military forces continue to carry out ground attacks throughout Donetsk Oblast.
  • Russian reports of the explosions that occurred within Dzhankoy, Crimea, indicated panic over losing further logistical capabilities in Crimea after incident with the Kerch Strait Bridge explosion.
  • Russian Federal subjects are announcing new extensions and periods of mobilization for selected regions, which could mean that they haven’t met their mobilization quotas.
  • Russian and occupation administration officials continue to carry out filtration operations within Russian-occupied territory.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
  • Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct offensive operations east of the Oskil River in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove on October 11. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces near Krokhmalne in Kharkiv Oblast (20km northwest of Svatove) and Stel’makhivka in Luhansk Oblast (15km northwest of Svatove).[19] The Russian MoD also claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to cross the Zherebets River southwest of Svatove in the direction of Raihorodka and Novovodiane, Luhansk Oblast, on October 11.[20] [21] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are regrouping and restoring combat capabilities near Kupyansk to prepare for assaults near the Pershotravneve-Kyslivka line.[22] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces are concentrating personnel and equipment in the Lyman-Svatove direction to launch an offensive on Svatove and Kreminna with a strike group of up to 40,000 personnel.[23]  ISW makes no effort to forecast Ukrainian operations or to evaluate the likelihood of Russian forecasts about them.

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted a local counterattack and recaptured territories west of Kreminna while continuing to establish defensive positions in the Kreminna-Svatove area on October 11. Russian milbloggers claimed on October 11 that Russian forces conducted counteroffensive operations east of Lyman and recaptured Terny, Torske, Novosadove, Makiivka, and Nevske, although ISW cannot independently verify any of these claims.[24] Russian sources posted videos on October 11 purporting to show Russian forces constructing trenches with BTM-3 entrenching machines along the Svatove-Kreminna line, with one source dubbing the effort a Russian-made “Maginot” line (referring to the massive belt of French fortifications built between the two world wars that the Germans simply drove around).[25] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai also reported that Russian forces are continuing to mine territory in Luhansk Oblast to slow Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted routine indirect fire along the Oskil River-Kreminna line on October 11.[27]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian troops conducted ground attacks in northern and western Kherson Oblast on October 11. The Russian MoD claimed that two Ukrainian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) conducted offensive operations in the direction of Borozenske and Piatykhatky—both along the current Davydiv Brid-Dudchany frontline in northern Kherson Oblast and about 35km from the critical Russian-controlled town of Beryslav.[28] A Russian milblogger similarly indicated that Ukrainian troops are preparing to advance south of the Davydiv Brid-Dudchany line and conducting artillery preparations for subsequent attacks on Russian positions in the direction of Beryslav.[29] Russian milbloggers additionally indicated that Ukrainian troops are attempting to reinforce positions in the Davydiv Brid area (western Kherson Oblast near the Mykolaiv Oblast border and along the Inhulets River) to prepare for advances to the southeast.[30] Several Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops attempted to attack toward Bruskynske (6km south of Davyvid Brid), Ishchenka (8km southeast of Davydiv Brid), and Sadok (12km southeast of Davydiv Brid).[31] ISW offers no evaluation of these Russian claims regarding likely future Ukrainian operations or force groupings.

Ukrainian military officials largely maintained their operational silence regarding Ukrainian ground attacks in Kherson Oblast but reiterated that Ukrainian forces are continuing an interdiction campaign to target Russian military, technical, and logistics assets and concentration areas.[32] Geolocated social media footage posted October 11 shows the aftermath of October 10 Ukrainian strikes on a medical college dormitory in Beryslav that Russian forces were reportedly using as quarters.[33] Imagery posted on October 11 additionally shows damage to the Antonivsky Bridge in Kherson City following a Ukrainian HIMARS strike.[34] Geolocated footage shows a Ukrainian RAM II loitering munition striking a Russian Osa air defense system near Kyselivka, 17km northwest of Kherson City.[35]

Similar The massive Russian missile strikes are having no impact on the Ukraine frontline. Extended Coverage The massive Russian missile airstrike have little effect on the Ukraine frontline.

 

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